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Abstract
In this paper, I put the ongoing G20 process of improving the regulation of interna-
tional finance into a historically informed perspective. To understand the driving forces 
behind and obstacles to international cooperation in governing finance I combine con-
cepts from international political economy and comparative political economy (IPE and 
CPE) that have previously been only loosely connected. Building on the IPE literature 
that highlights the historical and political embeddedness of financial regulation I depart 
from the IPE focus on the globalization of US–UK financial market capitalism. CPE 
studies show that, since the 1970s, different variations of capitalism have reacted in dis-
tinct ways to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, lower growth rates and saturated 
domestic markets. Most notably, there has been a divergence between the approaches of 
financializing countries (US, UK) and export-oriented countries (Germany, East Asian 
nations). The interdependence between financialized and export-oriented variations of 
capitalism has contributed to the dynamics and crises of international finance for the 
past four decades. This “imbalance of capitalisms” also became an obstacle to interna-
tional cooperation in regulating finance. Faced with the “trilemma of economic policies,” 
the financialized and export-oriented variants of capitalism have chosen different com-
binations of macroeconomic policies, currency policies, and the regulation of financial 
flows and financial firms. This divergence has led to conflicting preferences with regard 
to international cooperation to regulate finance. 
Zusammenfassung
Dieses Papier betrachtet die historischen Hintergründe der Schwierigkeiten und Kon-
flikte bei der (Re-)regulierung der internationalen Finanzbeziehungen in der G20. Diese 
Konflikte lassen sich besonders gut bei dem Versuch der Koordinierung von Fiskal- und 
Geldpolitik, der Regulierung von Banken und Finanzströmen sowie der Reduzierung 
globaler wirtschaftlicher Ungleichgewichte beobachten. Hierzu werden bisher nur unzu-
reichend verbundene Ansätze aus der Internationalen und der Vergleichenden Politi-
schen Ökonomie (IPÖ/VPÖ) kombiniert. Die IPÖ-inspirierte Betrachtung internatio-
naler Kooperation verbunden mit dem VPÖ-inspirierten Fokus auf die pfadabhängig 
unterschiedlichen Spielarten des Kapitalismus ermöglicht ein besseres Verständnis der 
Hintergründe von Konflikten bei der Regulierung internationaler Finanz beziehungen. 
Besonders berücksichtigt werden hierbei die unterschiedlichen Entwicklungen verschie-
dener Spielarten des Kapitalismus seit dem Zusammenbruch des Bretton-Woods-Sys-
tems Anfang der 1970er-Jahre. Die Interdependenz von finanzmarktorientiertem Kapi-
talismus in den Vereinigten Staaten und Großbritannien sowie exportorientierter 
Kapitalismusvarianten in Europa und Ostasien haben die internationalen Finanzbezie-
hungen in den letzten vier Jahrzehnten entscheidend geprägt. Beide Modelle unterschei-
den sich ganz erheblich bezüglich der institutionellen Arrangements bei der Regulierung 
von Finanzbeziehungen und der Fiskal-, Geld- und Währungspolitik. Diese Unterschie-
de wiederum führen zu divergierenden Präferenzen und Konflikten bei der internationa-
len Koordinierung der Regulierung von Finanzbeziehungen.
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Regulating International Finance and the Evolving  
Imbalance of Capitalisms since the 1970s
1 Introduction
The current global financial and economic crisis has brought the issue of a new global 
governance of finance into the political and academic mainstream. Four decades after 
the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates was abandoned in 1971, there is an 
intensive and controversial discussion ongoing within the G20, the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB), the IMF and other international organizations on how to improve in-
ternational cooperation in regulating finance and, thereby, preventing future financial 
crises. In this paper, I put this G20 process of improving the regulation of international 
finance into a historically informed perspective. I analyze the driving forces behind 
and obstacles to international cooperation in governing finance in a broad sense that 
includes the regulation of financial firms, financial flows, and currencies, and the coor-
dination of macroeconomic policies.
I criticize functionalist approaches to the analysis of financial regulation and propose 
an eclectic political-economy approach combining concepts of international political 
economy and comparative political economy (IPE and CPE) that have previously been 
only loosely connected. Building on the IPE literature that highlights the historical and 
political embeddedness of financial regulation I depart from the classic IPE focus on 
US–British financial market capitalism. I bring in CPE concepts of a diversity of capital-
ism that reject the hypothesis of a global convergence towards US–British style financial 
capitalism. CPE studies on European coordinated market economies and East Asian 
developmental states have shown a remarkable path dependency. Since the 1970s, dif-
ferent variants of capitalism have reacted in distinct ways to the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system, lower growth rates, and saturated domestic markets. Most notably, there 
has been a divergence between the approaches of financializing countries (such as the 
US and the UK) and export-oriented countries (such as Germany and the East Asian 
nations).
Since the 1970s, financialized and export-oriented countries have become the two poles 
of the world economy, contributing both to its dynamism and crises. This dynamic has 
also created global economic imbalances that have contributed to the global financial 
This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) grant funded by the 
Korean Government (MEST) (NRF-2009-09331). I would like to thank Christoph Deutschmann, 
Andreas Nölke, and Martin Höpner for their very valuable comments on this paper. Parts of this 
paper were written during my time as a visiting researcher at the Max Planck Institute for the Study 
of Societies in Cologne, from January to May 2011.
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and economic crisis that has been with us since 2007. More importantly for this paper, 
the “imbalance of capitalisms” is an obstacle to international cooperation in regulating 
finance. Faced with the “trilemma of economic policies” amid the collapse of the Bret-
ton Woods system, different variations of capitalism chose different combinations of 
macroeconomic policies, currency policies, and regulation of financial flows and finan-
cial firms. This divergence has led to conflicting preferences with regard to international 
cooperation on regulating finance. This is not to say that governments have no leeway 
to shape financial regulation on the national and international level, but my approach 
implies the need to look beyond “national egoisms” and highlight the deeper, systemic 
causes of international conflicts.
If my hypothesis is correct, comprehensive global governance of finance is more difficult 
than might be expected. Governments in the G20 are constrained not just by national 
interests but also by the path dependency of different variations of capitalism that are 
interdependent on the global level. This imbalance of capitalisms is an obstacle to inter-
national cooperation to improve bank regulation, curb erratic financial flows through 
capital controls or taxes, reduce exchange rate volatility or stimulate the global economy 
through fiscal stimulus packages and other reforms discussed in the G20. It is not just 
the financialized countries but also the export-oriented countries that are responsible 
for four decades of failed international cooperation to regulate finance. International 
cooperation would require not just institutional reform and a readjusting of the “levers 
and buttons” of the world economy, but also a new arrangement of the international 
division of labor and deep structural changes to domestic political economies. Changes 
would be needed not just in the financialized countries, but also in the export-oriented 
countries in Europe, East Asia and the emerging world.
In section 2, I introduce my argument and the concepts of an “imbalance of capitalisms” 
and the “trilemma of economic policies” in more detail. In sections 3 and 4, I analyze 
the conflicting preferences, positions, and policies of financialized and export-oriented 
countries, respectively, in the global governance of finance. Section 5 draws conclusions 
from the empirical analysis.
2 The imbalance of capitalisms and the dilemmas 
of international financial regulation
The imbalance of capitalisms since the 1970s
Interpretations of financial and economic crisis and their management are dominated 
by economists and often shaped by an implicit functionalist-technocratic bias. Crises 
are interpreted as regulatory failures and their management is seen in terms of regula-
tory and institutional reform. The economy is viewed as a more (by orthodox econo-
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mists) or less (by Keynesian economists) self-regulating machine that can be adjusted 
and optimized through the buttons and levers of economic policy. For example, finan-
cial markets can be brought under control by pulling the lever on the regulation of 
capital requirements for banks or derivatives. Global economic imbalances between the 
US and China are seen as a problem of “currency manipulation” that could be solved by 
adjusting the exchange rate button. In this functionalist view, conflicts in international 
cooperation to regulate finance are the result of “national egoisms” that prevent “best 
practice solutions.”
Scholars from the field of IPE challenge such a functionalist view by focusing not on 
individual “buttons and levers” but on the driving forces of the economic machinery 
and their embeddedness in domestic and international power struggles. The study of 
financial globalization, (de-)regulation, and crisis has a long tradition in the field of IPE. 
Particular attention has focused on the exponential growth of financial markets and 
international flows and the rise of “casino capitalism” (Strange 1986) since the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1971 (Enquete-Kommission 
2002; Lütz 2002). Financial globalization was accelerated by competitive deregulation 
in which countries competed to become the most attractive base for financial services 
(Helleiner 1994). A process of “financialization” (Krippner 2005; Epstein 2005) can be 
observed in most countries, but was particularly accentuated in the US and Britain.1 
According to Epstein, financialization can be defined broadly as an “increasing role of 
financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the 
operation of the domestic and international economies” (Epstein 2005: 3).
Within the field of IPE, there is a strong focus on the US as the hegemonic or at least 
most powerful country in the global economy and its regulation. Financial globaliza-
tion is often interpreted or criticized as a convergence towards Anglo-Saxon style finan-
cial market capitalism. IPE scholars have devoted particular attention to the role of 
international organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO to dissemi-
nate US-style institutions and spread the gospel of a market-oriented growth model 
(Bullard/Bello/Kamal 1998; Woods 2006; Kalinowski 2005, 2008). During crises – such 
as the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis – the IMF has tended to make financial and capital 
account liberalization a precondition for rescue packages, which led to the development 
of the thesis of a “Wall Street-Treasury-IMF Complex” (Veneroso/Wade 1998; Bhagwati 
1998). From this IPE perspective, international cooperation on regulating finance in the 
G20 since 2008 would constitute an at least partial departure from financialization. The 
importance of the financial industry for Britain and the US, as well as the opposition of 
the powerful financial lobby can thus be seen as an important obstacle to international 
cooperation (see section 3).
1 For example, in the 1990s, “rentier income” – that is, income derived from financial assets – was 
on average 33.5 percent of GDP in the US and 14 percent in Britain, compared to 11 percent in 
Japan and 7 percent in Germany (Epstein/Power 2003: 11–12).
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Studies of CPE, on the other hand, cast serious doubt on the hypothesis of convergence 
towards a US/British style financial market oriented capitalism. It was an important 
contribution of the varieties of capitalism (VoC) debate (Hall/Soskice 2001) to chal-
lenge the modernization-theory perspective that there is a convergence to one “best 
practice” variation of capitalism and that different forms of capitalism merely repre-
sent different “stages of economic growth” (Rostow 1990). While to some degree finan-
cialization can be observed in most countries, fundamental differences between liberal 
market economies (LMEs), such as the US and Britain, and coordinated market econo-
mies (CMEs), such as Germany, remain intact.2 This strong path dependency of differ-
ent variants of capitalism can be explained by an “institutional complementarily” that 
constitutes their “comparative institutional advantage” (Hall/Soskice 2001: 52).
Unfortunately, studies in CPE have remained focused on the Western world, with a few 
excursions into Japanese non-liberal capitalism (Streeck/Yamamura 2001; Vogel 2006). 
Given the importance particularly of the East Asian region – with G20 member coun-
tries China, Japan, and Korea – for the global economy and the negotiations on regulat-
ing global finance in the G20, it is necessary to include at least the East Asian countries 
in our analysis (see also Kalinowski 2011). After being outsourced to development or 
regional studies for too long, it is time to systematically bring the non-Western world 
into CPE studies (Nölke 2011). Case studies in the field of development studies on East 
Asian developmental states have revealed many similarities with European coordinated 
market economies (Johnson 1995; Woo-Cumings 1999; Kalinowski 2008). Most impor-
tantly for our purposes are the similarities in terms of strong government–business 
networks (Evans 1995) and the strong focus on national competitiveness. Most impor-
tantly for this paper, East Asian developmental states and European coordinated mar-
ket economies share an export-oriented growth model. Unlike financialized countries, 
export-oriented countries remain dominated by an industrial sector that is dependent 
on exports to grow (see section 4).3
Different variations of capitalism tend to react differently to similar challenges (Goure-
vitch 1986; Stallings 1995). Since the 1970s, the capitalist world has faced the challenges 
of lower growth rates, saturated domestic markets, and economic globalization. Amid 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, Anglo-Saxon liberal market economies, Eu-
ropean coordinated market economies and East Asian developmental states reacted 
with different strategies. While liberal market economies revitalized economic growth 
through financialization and by becoming the “bankers of the world,” coordinated 
market economies and developmental states reacted by pursuing an export-oriented 
growth model and become the “workshops of the world.”
2 Vogel (2006) speaks of a “remodeling” of Japanese capitalism and Yamamura and Streeck (2003) 
talk of the “hybridization” of German and Japanese capitalism.
3 One indicator of export orientation is a current account surplus. Between 2000 and 2007, this 
averaged 4.9 percent of GDP in China, 3.4 percent in Japan, 3.2 percent in Germany, 2.8 percent 
in Indonesia and 1.7 percent in Korea. Financialized countries, on the other hand, suffer from 
chronic current account deficits: for example, averaging 2.4 percent of GDP in the UK and 
5 percent in the US during the same period (IMF 2009).
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Since the 1970s, financialized and export-oriented countries have been the two poles 
of the world economy, fuelling its dynamics and crises. The interdependence of the dif-
ferent variants of capitalism allows export-oriented countries to grow at a faster rate 
than domestic wages and consumption, while it allows financialized countries to bor-
row cheaply abroad and consume more than domestic production. The resulting global 
economic imbalances have contributed to the creation of asset bubbles in financialized 
countries. Starting with the subprime mortgage market, these bubbles started to col-
lapse one by one in 2007, resulting in the worst global financial crisis since the 1930s.
National preferences with regard to international financial regulation and the conflicts 
between them must be seen in light of this dynamic of an imbalance of capitalisms. The 
failure to regulate international finance and the conflicting regulatory preferences are 
not just the result of malfunctions of the economic machinery and disagreements on 
which levers and buttons to adjust. The problem is rather the engine of the machine itself.
The trilemma of economic policy
Before we embark on an empirical analysis of how the imbalance of capitalisms leads 
to incompatible preferences in regulating global finance, we need to introduce a rough 
scheme that groups countries according to their preferences. Conflicts in three policy 
areas have dominated the agenda of the G20 since the beginning of the global financial 
and economic crisis in 2007: macroeconomic coordination, regulation of finance, and 
currency policy.
A good starting point for structuring the policy preferences with regard to external eco-
nomic policy is to modify the “Mundell-Fleming trilemma” (Mundell 1963; Obstfeld/
Shambaugh/Taylor 2005). In contrast to the original treatment of the trilemma by 
Mundell and Fleming, I combine sovereign fiscal and monetary policies into sovereign 
macroeconomic policies targeted to achieve domestic goals, such as reductions in un-
employment. In the original version of the trilemma, Mundell and Fleming argue that, 
under capital mobility and fixed exchange rates, sovereign fiscal policies are effective 
and sovereign monetary policies ineffective, whereas the effectiveness is the other way 
round under flexible exchange rates (Mundell 1963). However, in most cases, under the 
conditions of open capital accounts and stable exchange rates, sovereign fiscal policies 
have become ineffective as well, because governments fear that high public debt levels 
will create inflation and undermine the confidence of financial investors. This obses-
sion with anti-inflationary policies is particularly dominant in Germany and in the EU 
Maastricht Treaty (see section 4), but is also part of the Washington consensus that is 
recommended for or even imposed on developing countries by the IMF and the World 
Bank. On the other hand, countries with flexible exchange rates, such as the US and 
Britain, have been able to maintain sovereign fiscal policies (as seen in their obsession 
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with tax cuts), partly because their role as “bankers of the world” has allowed them 
hitherto to finance huge deficits (see section 3).
According to this modified “economic policy trilemma,” there are clear tradeoffs 
between desirable economic policies, such as stable exchange rates, sovereign macro-
economic policies, and open capital accounts. Only two of these goals can be achieved 
at any one time. Originally, the concept of the trilemma was used to explain only the 
constraints imposed on the macroeconomic policies of small and open economies, but 
it has explana tory power with regard to all countries. The level of constraint varies 
accord ing to the size of the economy. For smaller economies, the trilemma is an impos-
sible trinity, while large economies such as the EU, the US, China, and Japan are able to 
manipulate it, even though they, too, have to accept tradeoffs.
This modified concept can help us to group countries according to the policy choices 
they made when faced with the trilemma. Under the Bretton Woods system up until 
1971, countries combined fixed exchange rates with controls on private capital account 
flows, with the possibility of using the IMF to finance short-term current account defi-
cits in order to maintain sovereign fiscal and monetary policies that would help to facili-
tate rapid economic growth and ameliorate economic crises. Under the conditions of 
freely flowing capital, which proliferated from the end of the Bretton Woods system in 
1971 and became the orthodoxy from the 1980s, governments had to move away from 
the “Bretton Woods corner” of the trilemma triangle (Figure 1) and choose either to 
stabilize their currencies or to maintain sovereign fiscal and monetary policies. In the 
former case, their monetary and fiscal policies merely react to the inflows and outflows 
of capital. In the latter case, they can use monetary and fiscal policies to govern the 
economy and allow the exchange rate to adjust to the inflows and outflows of capital. 
Different variants of capitalism have dealt with this challenge in different ways and in 
doing so have chosen different sides of the “trilemma triangle.”4 Financialized countries 
such as the US and the UK have been the most enthusiastic supporters of the free flow 
of capital while maintaining an autonomous monetary policy to stimulate the domestic 
economy in the case of an economic downturn. On the other hand, the US and the UK 
have let their currencies float freely and have not intervened in the currency markets, 
although the US has used its international political power to pressure other countries 
to revalue their currencies against the dollar. The US and the UK are closest to what I 
call the “neoliberal corner”5 of the triangle; however, due to their ability to implement 
4 The three different goals that make up the impossible trinity are ideal-types. No country is com-
pletely sovereign in its monetary policies, and few have been able to maintain inflexible fixed 
exchange rates for long. Most importantly, all countries have some form of explicit or hidden 
capital controls at least for the case of a capital account crisis. However, even though ideal-types 
cannot be found in reality, it is observable that some countries come closer to them than others.
5 I use the term “Bretton Woods corner,” “neoliberal corner,” and “Keynesian corner” to high-
light the first priority of a certain set of policies, even though I am aware that, for example, the 
Keynesian solution is not limited to sovereign macroeconomic policies but also includes the 
strict control of capital, while the neoliberal solution is not exclusively focused on the free flow 
of capital but cares about monetary sovereignty as well.
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sovereign monetary and fiscal decisions, they, interestingly, also remain closer to what I 
call the “Keynesian corner” of the triangle (see Figure 1).6
Export-oriented countries in the EU, notably Germany, have also opened their capital 
accounts, but at a much slower pace. In contrast to the US, the EU established a regional 
system of fixed exchange rates within the European Union (European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism, ERM) in 1979, which led to the introduction of a single currency, the euro, 
in 1999. The EU countries – with the exception of the UK – thus remain close to the Bret-
ton Woods corner of the triangle while moving in the direction of the neoliberal corner.7
In contrast, Japan has continued its commitment to sovereign macroeconomic poli-
cy8 and exchange rate stability through managed floating, while private capital flows 
remain restricted through a combination of regulations and cultural factors, as we will 
see in section 4. The accumulation of foreign currency reserves in Japan and East Asian 
emerging markets also helped to protect their policy choices from the volatility of inter-
national financial markets because currency reserves provide a buffer against erratic 
capital flows (Aizenman/Chinn/Ito 2008).
Developing countries and emerging markets, unable to afford a completely free 
exchange rate, have copied either the European model (stable exchange rates plus open 
capital accounts) or the Japanese model (stable exchange rates plus a higher degree 
of sovereignty in macroeconomic policies). Concerning general tendencies, we can 
say that small developing countries or emerging markets that are export-dependent 
and/or have a strong financial sector – for example, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, and 
Korea since the 1990s – have preferred the “European model.” Developing countries and 
emerging markets with large domestic markets and/or active industrial policies – China, 
India, Brazil, and Korea until the 1990s), however, have preferred the “Japanese model,” 
includ ing the tendency to use foreign currency reserves as a buffer for erratic private 
capital flows (see Figure 1).
Countries with different variants of capitalism take different sides of the trilemma 
triangle, depending on their level of export orientation and financialization. Taking 
one side or another leads to distinct and partly conflicting preferences with regard to 
6 The ability of liberal market economies like that of the US to implement more expansive mac-
roeconomic policies than coordinated market economies such as Germany has also recently 
been described from a domestic political-economic perspective by Carlin and Soskice (2009; 
Soskice 2007).
7 Since the introduction of the euro as a common currency, the euro area (eurozone) seems to 
have moved away from the Bretton Woods corner because the external value of the euro is not 
among the goals of the European Central Bank (ECB). However, the priority of the internal 
stabilization of the eurozone (plus the so-called ERM 2 countries) has left little room for more 
Keynesian sovereign macroeconomic policies. In effect, the eurozone remains within the path 
dependency of the ERM.
8 For example, in 2006, the Japanese central government debt was 161 percent of GDP, nearly three 
times higher than what is considered “excessive” under the Maastricht Treaty (OECD 2009).
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international economic cooperation. These conflicts can be observed over the past forty 
years and currently constitute a formidable obstacle to reaching agreement in the G20. 
We can observe such conflicts in, for example, the main discussions in the G20 during 
2008–10 on improving the financial regulation of banks, the regulation of international 
financial flows, solutions with regard to erratic exchange rates, and ways of stimulating 
global growth through coordinated fiscal stimulus packages.9
Again, this is not to say that governments have no political room to maneuver at all. The 
constraints of path dependency are persistent but not rigid. Many other factors also 
play a role that may further limit governments’ political leeway or that may allow them 
to take a right or left turn at an intersection. Persistent changes over a longer period of 
time might also lead to a switch of sides in the trilemma triangle or even the adoption 
of a new growth regime.
9 These are the broad categories of issues related to financial regulation discussed in the five G20 
summits so far (G20 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b).
Figure 1 The imbalance of capitalisms and the “trilemma triangle” of economic policies
CMEs (Germany, 
EU, Korea 1990s−)
“Keynesian corner”
Goal: sovereign monetary and fiscal policies
“Neoliberal corner”
Goal: open capital accounts
“Bretton Woods corner”
Goal: stable exchange rates
DSs (Japan, China, 
Korea  −1990s)
LMEs 
(USA, Britain)
Export orientation
Financialization
LMEs: liberal market economies; CMEs: coordinated market economies; 
DSs: developmental states. The countries mentioned are examples.
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3 Financialization of capitalism in the US and the UK
Since the 1970s, financial markets and private capital flows have grown at a rapid pace, 
much faster than the real economy. This trend has gone hand in hand with and has been 
supported by financial and capital account liberalization (Helleiner 1994; Enquete-
Kommission 2002). In this process of financialization, financial investors and the finan-
cial industry have increasingly come to dominate the whole economy, a trend that was 
particularly accentuated in the UK and the US during – and as legacies of – the tenures 
of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. The financial industry – consisting of banks 
and non-bank financial firms – was transformed from a service industry facilitating real 
economic activities to the economy’s center of gravity. Not the production of capital 
but the global reallocation of capital through financial markets accounts for the eco-
nomic dynamism of financialized countries. Financial firms offer an increasing number 
of “financial innovations” that allow investors to increase their share of the profits dis-
tributed by the financial markets. This path of development offers a specific solution 
to the problem of weak domestic growth by providing financial services to countries 
around the world that have faster-growing real economies. In short, the UK and the US 
became the “bankers of the world.”
International finance plays a crucial role in any advanced economy by providing the 
service of reallocating capital from those who have it (savers) to those who need it (in-
vestors, consumers). An efficient financial system can be compared to other infrastruc-
tural services, such as public transport or sewage systems that do not produce a tan-
gible product but increase the productivity of the real economy. International finance 
is driven by and facilitates economic globalization, as it allows corporations to manage 
international production chains and creates what Saskia Sassen calls “global control 
ability” (Sassen 2001: 11). Despite its central role, the financial sector always depends 
on a functioning real economy that creates savings and requires investment. Some fi-
nancial centers provide their services primarily to the domestic economy (for example, 
Frankfurt for Germany and Tokyo for Japan). Financialized countries, however, are 
characterized by the fact that their financial sectors provide these services globally (for 
example, Wall Street in New York and “the City” in London) or at least regionally (for 
example, Hong Kong and Singapore for China and Southeast Asia).
Whether financialization is an economically sustainable strategy or not is beyond the 
scope of this paper. The global financial crisis, which commenced in 2007, has cast 
strong doubt on the viability of this “business model.” What is certain is that the domi-
nance of financial over manufacturing (“real”) capital is not entirely new and has been 
discussed at least since Rudolf Hilferding analyzed the “first wave of financialization” 
before World War 1. In his seminal work Das Finanzkapital (Hilferding 1910) he real-
ized that financialization was not just a certain set of economic policies but a specific 
stage of capitalism with a regulatory system shaped by the dominance of the interests 
of financial investors and financial institutions and legitimized by a distinct ideology. 
While this first wave of financialization differed from the one which started in the 1970s, 
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because it was dominated by universal banks, it is important to realize that the relation-
ship between financial and real capital has changed over time (see also Chernow 1997). 
World War 1 ended the first wave of financialization but financial capital enjoyed a re-
vival during the stock market bubble and the profitable but ultimately disastrous man-
agement of war debts in the 1920s that lead to the Great Crash of 1929 and the banking 
crisis of the early 1930s (Galbraith 1997: 191–232; Chancellor 1999). Financialization 
was pushed back during the New Deal of the 1930s and remained subordinate to in-
dustrial capital during the Keynesian era of the “new industrial state” (Galbraith 1967) 
from the 1930s until the 1970s. In the US, the “New Deal coalition” of big business, 
labor unions, and the Roosevelt administration singled out the financial sector as the 
main culprit with regard to the Great Depression of the 1930s.10 The US government 
strongly limited the influence and power of Wall Street through the Glass-Steagall Act 
of 1933, which required the separation of commercial and investment banking, thereby 
mandating the breakup of previously untouchable banks, such as JP Morgan (Chernow 
2001). Many other regulations that limited banking activities and competition were 
implemented while, at the same time, the banking system was given a safety net against 
bank runs through the newly introduced deposit insurance systems. The “financial in-
novations” of the 1920s – including stock market pools, insider trading, market manip-
ulation, and short selling in falling markets – were forbidden by the Security Exchange 
Act, and the Security and Exchange Commission was established to police financial 
markets (Kroszner/Strahan 2007; Chancellor 1999: 220–222).
Attempts to limit the influence of the financial industry were made throughout the 
world. After the collapse of the boom experienced by stock markets and financial mar-
kets in the 1920s, financial activities were seen as damaging to the real economy. This 
transformation was not peaceful and grounded in rational policies in all countries. In 
Germany, the Nazi government that came to power in 1933 promised the end of “inter-
est slavery” and applied its pseudo-scientific “racial theory,” blaming Jews – who were 
strongly represented in the financial community – for the “parasitic” character of the 
financial industry (Neumann 1981: 186–197). The racist separation between “parasitic 
Jewish financial capital” and “productive German capital” provided a pretext for expro-
priating Jewish bankers and utilizing the financial industry for the “military Keynesian-
ism” of the Nazis.
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and since the financial market liber-
alization of the following decades, the political influence of the financial industry has 
increased dramatically, although to differing degrees in different world regions. The 
trend towards financialization was stronger in the UK and the USA, where the “mil-
10 In his inauguration address, Roosevelt stated that “[p]ractices of the unscrupulous money 
changers stand indicted in the court of public opinion, rejected by the hearts and minds of 
men. … [I]n our progress toward a resumption of work we require two safeguards against a 
return of the evils of the old order; there must be a strict supervision of all banking and credits 
and investments; there must be an end to speculation with other people’s money, and there 
must be provision for an adequate but sound currency” (Roosevelt 1938: 13).
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itary industrial complex” that President Eisenhower had warned about in 1961 was 
supplemented, from the 1970s onwards, by the ”Wall Street–Treasury–IMF Complex” 
(Veneroso/Wade 1998; Bhagwati 1998).
The interests of financial firms and financial investors began to dominate the agenda 
of economic and financial reform, as well as academic and ideological discussions. Fi-
nancial markets and the sum of the decisions of financial investors became simply “the 
market,” and “gaining the confidence of ‘the market’” became the primary goal of busi-
ness and politics alike. Losing “market confidence” and the outflow of capital became 
capital punishments for businesses and whole countries. Finance became the point of 
reference for the economy and even non-financial companies started to behave like 
financial firms (Krippner 2005).
The power of the “financial oligarchy” (Johnson 2009) is personalized by the revolving 
door between Wall Street and the US administration. For example, about half of the US 
Treasury Secretaries since the 1970s worked at financial firms before and/or after their 
public service.11 Jobs in the financial industry were particularly attractive due to their 
high salaries and bonuses compared with other industries.12 Suddenly, working in the 
financial sector, which until the 1970s had been considered a dull job for the less am-
bitious, became attractive, and more and more of the top college graduates went into 
banking.
Finally, economic data support the financialization thesis: in the US in 2007, the finan-
cial industry accounted for 31.3 percent of corporate profits (my own calculation from 
US Department of Commerce 2008) compared with 13 percent in 1980 (Lahart 2008). 
Manufacturing became less important and less attractive for college graduates and, con-
sequently, the traditional industrial heartlands like the rustbelt in the US and various 
parts of the UK (for example, the north of England) suffered from deindustrialization.
Financialization was weaker in continental Europe and Japan, and it practically did not 
exist in the newly industrialized East Asian countries until the 1990s.13 European banks 
maintained their close relationships with industrial capital, which continues to rely on 
long-term credits to finance investments. The East Asian model of capitalism, in which 
banks played a subordinate role in economic development, is an even stronger coun-
11 More precisely, six of the thirteen Treasury Secretaries since 1972 came from or went into the 
financial industry: William Simon (Salomon Brothers), Donald Regan (Merrill Lynch), Nicho-
las Brady (William E. Simon), Lloyd Benson (Lincoln Consolidated), Robert Rubin (Goldman 
Sachs, Citigroup), and Henry Paulson (Goldman Sachs).
12 Jobs in the financial sector paid a premium of about 50 percent over non-financial jobs in 2005. 
In 1980, the premium was just 10 percent (Lahart 2008).
13 If we take the share of rentier income (income from financial activities plus interest incomes) in 
all incomes as a rough estimate of financialization, we find that Germany, Japan, Korea, Mexico, 
the Scandinavian countries, and Turkey have the lowest share, whereas the US, the UK, Italy and 
France have the highest (Epstein/Power 2003: 11–12).
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terpoint to financialization. In East Asia, developmental states used domestic banks to 
channel credits into the sectors earmarked for development, regardless of the banks’ 
profitability (Woo-Cumings 1991, 1999). The financial sector has evolved as an inde-
pendent, profit-oriented sector in East Asian developmental states only since the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997/98. It is hard to measure the degree of financialization, but the 
scale and scope of financial markets, the growth of the banking industry, the share of 
bank profits in overall corporate profits and, more generally, the share of rentier income 
(income derived from financial activities) all underline this trend.14
One consequence of the specific structure of financialized countries is that they have 
a distinct interest in international negotiations concerning the global governance of 
finance. Financialized countries obviously put a high priority on the free flow of capital, 
and they are thus closest to the “neoliberal corner” of the trilemma triangle (Figure 1). 
Massive profits can be realized in the financial sector only if capital can be allocated 
freely to the sectors and regions that promise the highest short-term returns. The big-
ger and more numerous the transactions, the more income financial firms can generate 
from the fees they charge for such transactions. In this context, financial deregulation 
or “light touch regulation” constitutes a competitive advantage over relatively more 
strictly regulated systems. Indeed, threats by financial firms to move their operations 
abroad have been one of the major driving forces behind the “competitive deregulation 
movement” (Helleiner 1994: 146–168). The US, both directly and indirectly, through its 
dominance of international financial institutions (IMF and World Bank), put pressure 
on countries around the world to open and liberalize their financial markets and thus 
allow US financial service companies to enter those markets (Bullard/Bello/Kamal 1998; 
Veneroso/Wade 1998; Stiglitz 2003; Woods 2006; Cho/Kalinowski 2010; Kalinowski/
Cho 2009). Also key is the soft power of US universities that educate a large percentage 
of the international financial and economic elites around the world, disseminating the 
notion that the US financialized market economy is the most advanced form of capital-
ism on earth and the one that other countries should emulate.
Within the group of financialized countries, we can distinguish between small and large 
economies. Small countries such as Hong Kong and Singapore tend to combine open 
capital accounts with fixed exchange rates in order to eliminate the exchange rate risk 
for financial investors. Hong Kong institutionalized this in a currency board system, 
while Singapore opted for an active exchange rate management system. As a trade-off, 
such economies lose their monetary and fiscal sovereignty because monetary and fis-
cal interventions have to react to the inflows and outflows of capital regardless of the 
needs of the domestic real economy. On the other hand, large financialized countries, 
such as the UK and the US, neglect exchange rate management and prefer to intervene 
actively in the domestic economy in order to stimulate growth and create jobs through 
monetary and fiscal policies. This preference has become particularly evident as a result 
of the global financial and economic crisis in which the US and the UK spearheaded 
14 For a discussion of rentier income and its development, see Epstein (2005: 46–74).
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loose monetary policies and deficit spending. Within the G20, financialized countries 
pushed for larger and internationally coordinated fiscal stimulus packages. In this sense, 
the more financialized “neoliberal” countries, ironically, are much closer to the Keynes-
ian corner of the trilemma triangle than more social democratic countries such as Ger-
many that have relied on exports to revive their economies.
As already mentioned, the US and the UK show little interest in the external value of 
their currencies and stable exchange rates in general. On the contrary, they use their 
international influence to pressure other countries – like Japan in the 1980s (Plaza and 
Louvre Accords) and China today – to stop “manipulating” their currencies and let the 
markets determine exchange rates. For financialized countries, volatility of exchange 
rates and financial markets in general are of little concern and even constitute a ma-
jor source of revenue because investors and export-oriented firms alike have to hedge 
against risks by purchasing financial products such as options or currency swaps from 
financial firms. The UK and the US, thus, are not interested in international or regional 
institutions that would coordinate exchange rates or regulate the flow of capital because 
this would limit business opportunities and diminish their competitive advantage. This 
explains why the current discussions in the G20 and the FSB largely neglect the very is-
sues that were at the core of the Bretton Woods system: fixed exchange rates and capital 
controls.
However, while the group of financialized countries opposes the regulation of financial 
flows, they are far less opposed to the regulation of market actors and financial prod-
ucts. Their experience with frequent market failures and financial crises has nurtured a 
pragmatic approach to financial regulation that acknowledges the need for a strong reg-
ulatory framework for financial actors and products. In fact, the current global finan-
cial and economic crisis has revealed that market actors and products were often even 
worse regulated in less financialized countries than in financialized countries. Financial 
firms in countries that have only recently started to liberalize their financial markets – 
such as the Central and Eastern European countries (and, to a lesser extent, Germany) – 
were hit hard by defaulting financial products because their regulatory systems had not 
caught up with the “financial innovations” available on globalized markets.15
15 In Germany, for example, 400,000 “Lehman certificates” were sold for 140 billion euros. These 
“certificates” were bets on the price development of various assets sold to small investors, a prac-
tice which is forbidden in the US and many other countries (Wilhelm 2009). Credits by text 
message (“SMS-credits”), with high interest rates, were an innovation in Scandinavian coun-
tries and are a significant problem in the financial crisis in the Baltic states (Koesch/Magdanz/
Stadler 2009).
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4 Export-oriented capitalism in Europe and East Asia
Less financialized countries have taken a different path in the post-Bretton Woods 
world. Despite their limited reliance on the financial sector for growth, their alternative, 
export-oriented strategy also sets up obstacles to the global governance of finance. As 
in financialized countries, economic growth rates declined and the bargaining power of 
labor unions weakened from the 1970s. However, it was not the financial sector but the 
export sector that became the new center of the economy and the engine of growth. Un-
like in financialized countries the financial industry remains just one industry among 
many and cannot claim a dominant position. Consequently, the main debate in these 
countries is not about how to attract investment deals that enable financial firms to 
grow but about how to improve national competitiveness while ensuring the profit-
ability and stability of international savings earned from exports. For governments the 
challenge became how to prevent the outflow of capital and become attractive for real 
investments in order to create or at least preserve jobs. Consequently, these countries 
did not deindustrialize, but increased productivity by becoming more capital- and 
technology-intensive. Profitability was not achieved primarily through financialization 
and downsizing but by incremental upgrading to capital- and technology-intensive in-
dustrial production, particularly in Europe and Japan, as well as in – albeit to a lesser 
degree – emerging Asia. The sophistication of this transformation varied within the 
export-oriented camp, ranging from the cheap mass production of consumer goods 
in China to the “diversified quality production” (Streeck 1995) in Germany and Japan.
This gradual transformation was facilitated by their “organized capitalism” (Vogel 2003) 
or “coordinated market economies” (Hall/Soskice 2001) favoring incremental changes 
and innovations over radical ones. Organized capitalism is characterized not by the 
power of financial markets, but by the close connection between industrial capital and 
house banks. The stronger corporatism in these countries in the form of tripartite co-
operation between labor unions, employer organizations and government (konzertierte 
Aktion and Bündnis für Arbeit in Germany, Sanrokon in Japan) made possible wage mod-
eration that ensured profitability and export competitiveness. This focus on national 
competitiveness had its price as repressed wages and unemployment led to sluggish do-
mestic demand for consumer products. Weak domestic demand further aggravated the 
structural dependency on exports due to the specialization on high-quality consumer 
products and machinery that, naturally, have more globalized markets. For example, in 
Germany, one-fifth of all employment directly or indirectly depends on exports. In the 
important manufacturing sectors it is much higher: about 65 percent in machinery, 68 
percent in vehicles, and 82 percent in chemical products (Schintke/Staeglin 2003: 144). 
In these countries, the term “markets” is not synonymous with financial markets, but 
with export markets and the ability to gain market share from competitors. The focus 
on national competitiveness and the dependence on exports create and are reinforced 
by a distinctive ideology of thrift, high savings rates, a reluctance to consume, and sta-
bility of prices and exchange rates.
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Like financialization, export-oriented capitalism is not a new phenomenon; if anything, 
it can be traced back even further, to the mercantilism of early capitalist development. 
Already in the mid-nineteenth century, Friedrich List (1856) criticized David Ricardo’s 
theory of comparative advantage, arguing that late developers needed to protect their 
infant industries. He recommended that government policy should abandon free trade 
and focus on nurturing national competitiveness. These strategies were implemented 
successfully by rising exporters such as Germany and, later, Japan in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Like financialization, two world wars and the world economic 
crisis of the 1930s undermined the export-oriented development model. The attempted 
militaristic expansion of Germany and Japan that would have secured access to natural 
resources and export markets was defeated in 1945.
The Bretton Woods system from 1945 to 1971 saw a massive increase in global trade, 
but trade imbalances declined due to the rapid rises in domestic demand in all coun-
tries due to reconstruciton after the war and the transformation of Europe and Japan 
into “Fordist” mass consumption societies. Only towards the end of the Bretton Woods 
system did the US start to run a trade deficit and European countries and Japan trans-
formed their growth models from inward-looking reconstruction to outward oriented 
expansion of global market share. Since the 1970s, newly industrializing East Asian 
countries (particularly Taiwan, South Korea, and, since the 1990s, China) have joined 
the export-oriented camp, specializing in the mass production of cheap consumer 
goods and transport equipment. Most of these developmental states have borrowed 
from Japanese and German development strategies (Woo-Cumings 1999; Wade 2004) 
or, in the case of China, have combined these experiences with state ownership of in-
dustry (Cho 2005).
The group of export-oriented countries has reacted very differently to the breakdown 
of the Bretton Woods system. As export-oriented economies, they are interested in 
stable exchange rates in order to allow their exporters predictable prices. Most export-
oriented countries thus opted to replace the Bretton Woods arrangement with regional 
or national mechanisms to stabilize currencies. They joined the eurozone, adopted the 
dollar (dollarization) or fixed their currencies to one (or several) of the major currencies 
(currency pegs or currency boards), thus remaining close to the “Bretton Woods corner” 
of the trilemma triangle (see Figure 1). This choice means that, under the condition of 
an open capital account, these countries have had to surrender their mone tary and fiscal 
sovereignty. Either they have delegated it to regional level, such as the European Central 
Bank (ECB) within the eurozone, or they have transferred it to another country, in the 
cases of dollarization, currency boards or unilateral currency pegs. Managed floating 
systems – as in China, Singapore, Korea and many developing countries – represent a 
compromise between exchange rate stability and fiscal and monetary sovereignty.
A surrender of monetary and even fiscal sovereignty is less dramatic for export-oriented 
economies because they depend less on active macroeconomic policies. They rather 
rely on their export competitiveness to profit from demand created abroad, and in 
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this way compensate for low domestic demand in the case of an economic downturn. 
Export-oriented countries have reacted to the instability on the financial markets and 
the declining growth rates since the 1970s by expanding into foreign markets and con-
centrating on national competitiveness. Export orientation thus was an effective means 
of overcoming the limitations of saturated domestic markets. The successful macroeco-
nomic turnaround in East Asia after the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis is a good example 
of export-oriented crisis-recovery strategies, the contribution of monetary and fiscal 
stimuli to that recovery having been relatively small (Kalinowski 2008, 2005). In the 
current crisis, Germany, which had the world’s second largest current account surplus 
in 2008, has been much more cautious than the US or other European countries with 
current account deficits in introducing fiscal stimulus packages. Countries more open 
to foreign trade also tend to have stronger social security systems (Rodrik 1998) that 
reduce the urgency of fiscal sovereignty, in that social spending acts as an automatic sta-
bilizer by increasing public spending in the form of unemployment payments and other 
instruments for protecting people’s livelihoods during economic downturns.16
The European Union and particularly the eurozone (EU17) has continued to pursue 
German-style conservative monetary and fiscal policies. Germany has pushed through 
its demands for ECB independence and fiscal austerity. The German central bank 
(Bundesbank) and, since 1999, the European Central Bank (ECB) are de facto (Bundes-
bank) and de jure (ECB) independent from the sovereign political decision-making 
process (EU 1992a: Art. 7). They both have the primary goal of maintaining price sta-
bility (EU 1992a: Art. 2), which limits a government’s ability to manage the economy 
through monetary policies.17 The ECB is not formally part of the political decision-
making process but a seemingly technocratic institution that merely reacts to develop-
ments determined by markets. The sovereignty of fiscal policies has also been severely 
restricted in the eurozone by the Maastricht Treaty, which formulated the precondi-
tions for entering the eurozone and was pushed through by the German government. 
The Maastricht Treaty specifies that “Member States shall avoid excessive government 
deficits.” In the annex “Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure,” the Treaty limits the 
fiscal deficit to 3 percent of GDP and the total amount of public debt to 60 percent of 
GDP (EU 1992b: Art. 104c).
There are distinct positions in the “trilemma triangle,” even within the EU. As discussed 
in section 3, the UK has followed the US approach and stayed outside the eurozone 
while continuing to stimulate the economy, when necessary, through interest-rate poli-
cies and fiscal stimuli. Even within the eurozone, France has not fully accepted German 
monetary leadership and the fiscal restraints of the Maastricht criteria. This conflict can 
16 There are important exceptions, for example Japan and Korea, that still rely mostly on corpora-
tion-based social security and have only recently begun to improve their social security systems.
17 Both principles are also part of the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 130). Some EU countries, such as Ger-
many, have even changed their constitutions accordingly, so as to leave no doubt about their 
surrender of sovereign monetary policies (Art. 88 of the German Constitution [Grundgesetz] 
was changed on 21 December 1992).
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be seen very clearly in the struggle within the EU over fiscal stimulus packages and ECB 
monetary policy amid the current global financial and economic crisis (Barber 2009). 
France, instead, has continued with some degree of fiscal sovereignty, safeguarded by an 
economic nationalism that does not amount to capital account controls but limits the 
exposure to foreign international capital.
The distinct positions of export-oriented countries on the trilemma triangle have re-
sulted in the emergence of certain sets of priorities concerning the global governance 
of finance. While currency stability is a high priority for this group of countries, they 
have largely abandoned global solutions. With the euro and the ERM, the EU has found 
a successful regional solution for the problem of currency volatility, which diminishes 
the pressure at least on European countries to seek global solutions. Most of the re-
maining countries – and particularly the East Asian region – remain in desperate need 
of a solution for currency volatility. The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) of bilateral and 
multilateral currency swaps is a first step towards regional currency cooperation, but for 
now East Asian countries have to rely on the very expensive national self-help strategy 
of accumulating currency reserves (Park/Wang 2005).
In contrast to financialized countries, export-oriented countries are interested in curb-
ing erratic short-term financial flows that lead to currency volatility, put pressure on 
their exchange rate regimes and undermine their competitive industrial structure 
(Zimmermann 2010). While export-oriented countries have also followed the trend of 
capital account liberalization they have done so later and more slowly. They are more 
cautious about opening up their own financial markets because they fear that financial 
liberalization would undermine their export competitiveness: in a system of floating ex-
change rates, capital inflow leads to currency appreciation. This “financialization curse” 
can be observed, for example, in the deindustrialization of the US since the 1980s and 
the exit of the British pound from the ERM in 1992.18 In the case of a fixed exchange 
rate system, an inflow of foreign capital leads either to inflation or to current account 
deficits. The latter development was symptomatic in the East Asian countries before the 
Asian financial crisis, when massive capital inflows pushed current accounts into deficit 
(Kalinowski/Cho 2009).
Among export-oriented countries we can distinguish two groups that react differently 
to the financialization curse and thus occupy different sides of the trilemma triangle 
(see Figure 1). Late developers, such as East Asian newly industrialized countries until 
the 1990s and China, have relied on formal capital controls to nurture national com-
petitiveness. Japan has formally liberalized its capital accounts but remains somewhat 
insulated from global financial markets due to informal barriers to capital inflows (but 
not outflows), such as industrial policies favoring “national champions” or structural 
and cultural barriers (for example, the system of cross shareholding, strong majority 
18 Interestingly, financialized countries appear to have similarities with countries suffering from the 
“resource curse” and in which dominant extraction industries crowd out other economic activities.
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shareholders and a rejection of hostile takeovers). All these aspects of Japanese capital-
ism not only discourage long-term investment but also reduce the profitability of short-
term investments. In contrast, European countries have fully liberalized their financial 
markets, although they, too, are to some degree protected by cultural barriers, such as 
strong majority shareholders in SMEs and cross shareholding in Germany or economic 
nationalism in France.
Unlike financialized countries, export-oriented economies are less interested in chan-
neling capital through their own economies because, as capital exporters, they have an 
abundance of capital and lack the global financial deal makers based in London’s “City” 
and New York’s Wall Street.
Even though export-oriented countries do not depend on financial liberalization for 
growth and have a stronger interest in curbing financial volatility, they are not generally 
more cooperative at the international level when it comes to the global governance of 
finance. They are themselves partly responsible for destabilizing financial flows because 
much of those flows originate in their export of capital to deficit countries either in the 
form of private foreign savings in the case of Europe or currency reserves in the case of 
East Asia and, in particular, China (“sinodollars”). The main concern of capital export-
ers is not the free flow of short-term capital that creates vast numbers of deals for the 
global financial players but the ability to invest excess capital abroad and the security 
that these foreign investments create returns or at least do not lose their value. Unlike 
financialized economies that profit from financial transactions as such because they 
charge fees for making deals, capital exporters are stability-oriented and interested in 
preserving the long-term value of their foreign savings. International creditor countries 
are thus in favor of stabilizing erratic financial markets by curbing short-term financial 
flows, but on the other hand they oppose any regulation that would undermine their 
ability to manage their international assets. Another concern of international creditors 
is that international debtors such as the US will use inflationary policies to reduce their 
debt burdens, rendering their foreign savings worthless. Their focus on anti-inflation 
policies means that they will resist any comprehensive international cooperation in 
macroeconomic policies and a return to the “Keynesian corner.”19
Export-oriented countries’ obsession with national competitiveness is another factor 
that makes them unlikely to champion global governance of finance. Comprehensive 
global governance of finance would not just reduce profits from speculative and short-
term financial deals but would also require a reduction of global imbalances and thus 
export surpluses in Europe and East Asia. Export-oriented countries will be very reluc-
tant to give up their economic stimulus from abroad, for example by appreciating their 
currencies or by stimulating domestic consumption through wage increases or public 
19 This explains particularly well the constant warnings against inflationary policies from German 
Chancellor Merkel and her push to put fiscal consolidation on the agenda of the G20 summit in 
Toronto in June 2010.
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investment. The ideology of national competitiveness, wage restraint and thrift that 
have formed over decades will not disappear overnight. The reliance of export-oriented 
countries on foreign consumption is likely to provoke a protectionist backlash with the 
potential to further undermine global cooperation.
5 Conclusions
The four lost decades of failure to establish a new regime for global governance of fi-
nance after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system cannot be explained merely by 
the lack of political actors and institutions willing and able to develop new visions and 
overcome national egoisms and collective action problems. The different interests in 
international discussions and negotiations on regulating finance in the G20 also have 
systemic origins. Countries with different variants of capitalism have reacted in dif-
ferent ways to the demise of the Bretton Woods system and the challenge of low real 
growth rates and saturated domestic markets since the 1970s. Most importantly, we 
have presented financialized countries (the US, the UK) and export-oriented countries 
in Europe and East Asia as forming a relationship of mutual dependence. This part-
nership has been far from harmonious but has created gigantic global economic im-
balances that have contributed to the global financial and economic crisis since 2008. 
These global economic imbalances are not just technical problems of current account 
surpluses and deficits, but the result of a much deeper rooted imbalance of capitalisms. 
Both variations of capitalism include distinct economic structures, complementary in-
stitutions and ideologies that create a strong path dependency.
The divergence of policy responses since the 1970s was highlighted particularly in the 
currency policies by which countries switched from the internationally coordinated 
Bretton Woods system to floating exchange rates, regional monetary systems or uni-
lateral exchange rate pegs. In other areas, including macroeconomic policies, financial 
regulations and market ideology, different paths were also taken. Concerning the regu-
lation of financial markets and financial flows, countries moved in the same direction, 
that of financial liberalization and the opening of markets, albeit with very different 
scopes and at various speeds. As a result, countries moved from a position between the 
Bretton Woods corner and the Keynesian corner of the trilemma of economic policies, 
closer to the neoliberal corner. However, financialized countries remained closer to the 
Keynesian corner, while export-oriented countries remained in proximity to the Bret-
ton Woods corner (see Figure 1).
Consequently, financialized and export-oriented countries developed different prefer-
ences for the global governance of finance. Financialized countries pressured for finan-
cial liberalization and capital account opening (“structural adjustment”) in order to 
facilitate the expansion of their financial industries. Export-oriented countries were 
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less enthusiastic about financial market opening and remained more focused on in-
creasing national competitiveness and stabilizing exchange rates. While financialized 
countries are strictly opposed to regulation of financial flows, they are far less dogmatic 
about the regulation of financial actors and products due to their frequent experience 
with financial crises. Financialized and export-oriented countries have also differed 
fundamentally in their interpretation of global economic imbalances, which observers 
in export-oriented countries see as a consequence of over-consumption in financial-
ized countries, and which observers in financialized countries see as a consequence of 
under-consumption in export-oriented countries.
My research offers some important clues with regard to the prospects for a new system 
of global governance of finance or a “new Bretton Woods” now being discussed within 
the G20. Due to their different positions on the trilemma triangle, countries have tak-
en different positions within the G20. The resulting deadlock has shaped the lost four 
decades since the 1970s and continues to influence the G20 process today. Financial-
ized countries exert pressure for internationally coordinated fiscal stimulus packages; 
are open to improved regulation of market actors; are uninterested in international 
currency coordination; and oppose the regulation of financial flows. Export-oriented 
countries, by contrast, push for tighter regulation of financial actors and markets and 
want to discuss an international currency regime but are reluctant to increase govern-
ment spending or reduce their dependence on exports. This divergence of interests is 
deeply embedded in the distinct forms of capitalisms, including economic structure, 
institutions, consumption patterns, and ideology.
Mere institutional reforms and a fine-tuning of the levers and buttons of financial regu-
lation will not be enough. Any successful agreement on the comprehensive and interna-
tionally coordinated regulation of finance in order to prevent future potential crises will 
be realistic only if there are more fundamental changes in the organization of the global 
economy. Financialized countries would have to reduce their dependence on their fi-
nancial industries and give up their ideology of capital account liberalization. Export-
oriented countries would have to reduce their dependence on current account surpluses 
and overcome their obsession with national competitiveness. Such a change would be 
difficult and will take time but it is not impossible. While these structural changes have 
to go hand in hand with regulatory reforms, they are not a precondition for political 
action. We have seen in the past that the trilemma triangle is not static but dynamic. 
Countries have switched sides in the past and there is no reason to assume that a conver-
gence of interests similar to the one under the Bretton Woods system cannot re-emerge 
if it is possible to curb the power of the financial oligarchy and the export lobby alike.
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